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4.0/).1. Introduction
Many of the most important decisions that individuals make
over their life course involve trade-offs over payoffs at different
points in time. In the field of finance the concept of timepreference,
as well as the distinct yet related concept of risk preference,
lies at the heart of asset pricing models and many other finance
theories. Controlled experiments, whether in a laboratory or field
setting, provide a natural and attractive framework to study time
discounting, as they enable researchers to systematically vary the
icle under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/
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makers’ preferences. Moreover, given the importance of time
preference in applied settings, such experimental measures are
increasingly included in studies where time preference is not the
focal variable, but where instead the objective is to control for the
effect of individual differences in future orientation in the study of
other behaviors.1
A theoretical challenge that has motivated significant recent
advances in time preference research is the potential confounding
influence of non-linear utility upon estimates of the discount
function. This issue came to the wider attention of researchers
through the survey of Frederick et al. (2002, pp. 381–2) although
it was known to specialists prior to that time. Since then there
has been considerable progress on controlling for utility in the
measurement of time preference, yet little clear consensus over
preferred methods has emerged. Indeed, a prominent strand of
recent literature has been framed as a contest between two
approaches in particular, namely the joint elicitation approach of
Andersen et al. (2008, 2014) and the convex time budget approach
of Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a).
This paper presents a methodological survey of recent experi-
mental research on time preference, with a specific focus on issues
of experimental design, in particular the measurement or control
for potentially non-linear utility. Studies reviewed in the survey are
classified on twodimensions:whether they assumean equivalence
between utility under risk and over time, and whether they result
in an estimate of the curvature of utility. The survey situates each
of the leading approaches in a broader context by relating them
to some less well-known designs. The aim of the survey is to ex-
pose the underlying assumptions and logic of each design that al-
low for utility and discounting to be disentangled, and the discount
function identified. Because of this, some important issues are sup-
pressed to the background. Firstly, I do not discuss econometric
estimation in any detail.2 Secondly, I generally review aggregate
estimates of the preferences of a representative agent. Finally,
while the conceptual framework (set out in Section 2) is agnostic to
the functional form of the discount function, I generally review es-
timates of annual exponential discount rates, as these are reported
in most studies, readily interpretable, and comparable across
studies.3
2. Conceptual framework: discounted utility
I follow the vastmajority of experimental literature in assuming
that a stream of time-dated payoffs (to be deliveredwith certainty)
is evaluated according to its discounted utility:
DU =

t
D (t) · v (xt) (1)
1 See for example Falk et al. (2016) for a large-scale study in this spirit.
2 In general, choice-based designs are amenable to maximum likelihood
procedures such as those of Andersen et al. (2008, 2014) while matching and
allocation designs are most commonly analyzed using some form of least squares—
although a variety of alternative procedures have been proposed in the specific
context of the convex time budget design (Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012a; Harrison
et al., 2013; Andreoni et al., 2015). Some advantages and drawbacks of these broad
approaches have been debated by Harrison et al. (2013) and Andreoni et al. (2015).
3 Also, consistent with contemporary expectations in experimental economics,
I focus on studies in which all choices were potentially for real payment. Given
my focus on the logical structure of experiment design, this might appear to be
an arbitrary choice. However, since the use of purely hypothetical incentives gives
additional degrees of freedom to the researcher, it is not always clear how a
hypothetical design may be transferred to a fully incentive-compatible setting.where D (·) is a discount function with D (0) = 1 and D′ < 0, and
v (·) is an instantaneous utility functionwith v (0) = 0, v′ > 0 and
v′′ ≤ 0. Letting the date of the experiment be 0, D (t) is the weight
attached to utility t periods in the future relative to utility today.
Instantaneous utility v (·) in choice over time is analogous to
Bernoulli utility u (·) in choice under risk. For example, under
expected utility a bundle of state-contingent payoffs is evaluated
according to:
EU =

s
p (s) · u (xs) (2)
where p (s) is the probability of state s. Under expected utility,
the concavity of Bernoulli utility captures a decision-maker’s risk
aversion (preference for more equal payoffs over different states
of nature). Similarly under discounted utility, the concavity of
instantaneous utility captures her attitude toward intertemporal
substitution (preference to smooth payoffs over different points in
time).
Although risk aversion and intertemporal substitution are in
principle distinct preferences, Bernoulli and instantaneous utility
are often assumed to be one and the same. This is usually explicit
when risk and time interact—both in the standard model of dis-
counted expected utility and some behavioral models (e.g., Halevy,
2008; Epper and Fehr-Duda, 2012). Perhaps because of this, the
assumption is sometimes made even when risk and time are not
inherently intertwined, such as when eliciting time preference
under certainty. Aswill be seen, the limited experimental evidence
on the equivalence of utility for risk and time is mixed at best. This
has implications not only for experimental methodology, but also
for the modeling of interactions between risk and time. In particu-
lar, the Epstein and Zin (1989) model of recursive preferences has
proven useful inmacroeconomics and finance because it allows for
just such a separation.
While the full design of an experiment may involve multiple
payment dates, in any given decision a subject typically makes a
choice involving only two dates.4 In this case (1) reduces to:
DU = D (t) · v (xt)+ D (t + k) · v (xt+k) (3)
where t is the ‘‘front-end delay’’ to the sooner date, and k is the
‘‘back-end delay’’ between dates.
Eqs. (1) and (3) are agnostic with respect to the functional
form of D (t). Well-known specifications include the standard
exponential model D (t) = 1/ (1+ ρ)t where ρ is the discount
rate,5 and the quasi-hyperbolic model D (t) = β/ (1+ ρ)t where
β captures present bias. A wide variety of other models have been
proposed, andmany of themare reviewed byAndersen et al. (2014,
Section 2 and Appendix D).6
The primary objective of a time preference experiment is
usually to estimate parameters of D (t). However as (1) and (3)
make clear, a subject’s choices are guided by both the discount and
utility functions. Therefore tomake unbiased inferences about one,
it is necessary to acknowledge the influence of the other. To see
this, consider the absolute slope of an indifference curve of (3) in
4 As will be seen, depending upon the design the subject may receive payment
on one or both of these dates.
5 δ ≡ 1/ (1+ ρ) is the discount factor for one period of delay. The subject ismore
patient as ρ is close to zero, or δ close to one.
6 Analogously, a popular alternative to expected utility is to generalize (2) by
replacing p (s) with a non-linear probability weight, while retaining the additive
structure; see Fehr-Duda and Epper (2012) for a review of the probabilityweighting
function.
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− dxt+k
dxt

DU
= D (t)
D (t + k) ·
v′ (xt)
v′ (xt+k)
. (4)
This is a product of two terms: D (t) /D (t + k) is the relative
value of utility at t compared to t + k (an inverse discount factor),
while v′ (xt) /v′ (xt+k) captures the effect of diminishing marginal
utility upon the payoffs. For the special case of linear utility, the
second term drops out and a subject’s choices are determined
solely by the discount function. More generally, if utility is concave
then as xt+k falls relative to xt the second term declines in value,
generating conventional convex indifference curves that ‘‘bow in’’
toward the origin. Finally, notice that evenwhenutility is not linear
the second term cancels out at xt+k = xt , where the indifference
curve intersects the diagonal and the subject receives equal payoffs
on both dates.
3. Base camp: the binary choice list
To illustrate the effect of non-linear utility, consider the classic
choice list design of Coller and Williams (1999) and Harrison
et al. (2002). A subject makes a series of binary choices between
alternatives that pay solely on either the sooner or later payment
date. As the subject moves through the list, the smaller sooner
option is typically fixed while the larger later one progressively
improves, implying increasing interest rates for delay of payment.
Assuming linear utility, the point at which a subject first switches
to accepting delayed payment gives ameasure of her (exponential)
discount rate.7 This basic approach remains popular today.
Suppose that, on the basis of this design, a subject is found
to be indifferent between X at date t (and nothing at t + k), or
Y > X at t + k (and nothing at t). Then, one can infer that
D (t + k) /D (t) = v (X) /v (Y ), a k-period discount factor for
utility. The difficulty, of course, is that v (·) is unobserved. If one
assumes that utility is linear, when in fact it is concave, one instead
infers that D (t + k) /D (t) = X/Y , a k-period discount factor for
money. Since concave utility implies that v (x) increases less than
proportionately with x, it follows that X/Y < v (X) /v (Y ). One
thus underestimates the subject’s discount factor, overestimating
how impatient she is. Intuitively, both diminishingmarginal utility
and time discounting reduce the attractiveness of the larger later
option. Therefore, if the former is assumed away then the effect of
the latter is overstated. These observations havemotivated a series
of advances in the design of experiments to measure (or otherwise
control for) utility in the elicitation of time preference, which are
the focus of this survey.
4. Assuming equivalence of utility for risk and time
4.1. Joint elicitation
The most influential experiment design to measure time
preference controlling for non-linear utility is the joint elicitation
strategy of Andersen et al. (2008). This uses the binary choice
approach to infer the discount function conditional upon utility,
while a risk preference task is used to infer the utility function.
7 In practice, as the larger later option increases in discrete increments, it is only
possible to infer bounds on the discount rate.The approach thus assumes equivalence of utility for risk and time,
which is also the default assumption in standard theory. Moreover
the measurement of utility is better understood in the context of
risk than any other domain,8 and until quite recently little was
known about how to infer utility outside of this domain.
The specific risk preference task used by Andersen et al.
(2008) is based upon Holt and Laury (2002), a very well-known
experiment that itself builds upon the logic of a choice list.
In subsequent work, Andersen et al. (2014) further refine their
approach, including by dispensing with the choice list format
in favor of presenting choices one at a time; nonetheless, the
underlying logic remains unchanged.
While joint elicitation assumes equivalence of utility for
risk and time, a strength of the approach is that it need not
assume expected utility under risk. This is notable because under
alternatives such as rank-dependent utility (Quiggin, 1982), risk
aversion in a task such as Holt and Laury may be attributable
to both the utility function and non-linear probability weighting.
Since it is only the former that is applicable to the measurement of
time preference, neglecting the possibility of probabilityweighting
may cause estimates of utility to be misspecified, resulting in
biased estimates of the discount function.
Andersen et al. (2008) conduct an experiment using a
representative sample of 253 adult Danes, with parameters t = 1
month, k taking six values up to 24 months, X = DKK 3000, and
annual interest rates up to 50%. There was a 10% chance that each
subject received real payment for one of her choices.
Using binary choice data for time while assuming linear utility,
Andersen et al. estimate an annual discount rate of 25.2%. They
also find substantial aversion to risk, with an estimated CRRA
coefficient of 0.74 under expected utility.9 The effect of correcting
for this amount of utility curvature is to substantially lower the
estimated discount rate to 10.1%. Andersen et al. (2014, Section
5.3 and Appendix F) confirm that the main implications of joint
elicitation are robust to alternatives to expected utility. While they
indeed find evidence of non-linear probability weighting, most
aversion to risk derives from the utility function.10
4.2. Probability-based methods
Althoughnot as influential as joint elicitation, two other designs
have been proposed to estimate discount rates, controlling for non-
linear utility, while assuming equivalence of utility for risk and
time. Both offer the tantalizing possibility that this may be done
without explicitly estimating utility itself, and followa similar logic
of ‘‘translating’’ the back-end delay into an ‘‘equivalent’’ variation
in the probability of payment. In each case, the price paid for
bypassing utility is that it is necessary to assume expected utility
under risk.
Laury et al. (2012) introduce a choice list design using a single
nonzero payoff M . A subject makes a series of binary choices
between a lottery that pays M at date t with probability pt (and
zero otherwise), or one that pays the same amount at t + k with
probability pt+k ≥ pt , with pt+k improving through the list.
8 See Harrison and Rutström (2008) for a comprehensive survey.
9 This is the parameter α in u (x) = x1−α/ (1− α) where α = 0 represents
linear utility, while α > 0 implies concave utility. Some papers instead estimate
the power function u (x) = xa where a = 1 − α. I report the CRRA parameter α
throughout.
10 Indeed, they estimate an S-shaped weighting function, as opposed to the
inverse-S typically presumed. As a result, utility is actually more concave
after allowing for probability weighting, and the estimated discount rate falls
insignificantly.
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expected utility, at a point of indifference one infers that:
D (t) · [pt · u (M)+ (1− pt) · u (0)]
= D (t + k) · [pt+k · u (M)+ (1− pt+k) · u (0)] .
Normalizing u (0) = 0 this simplifies to:
D (t + k)
D (t)
= pt
pt+k
. (5)
Laury et al. conduct an experiment using 103 US student
subjects, with parameters t = 3 weeks, k = 9 weeks, M =
USD 200, pt = 0.5 and pt+k ∈ [0.5, 0.647] (implying annual
interest rates up to 347%). They also conduct a version of joint
elicitation using the same subjects, to permit comparison between
the methods.
In their replication of joint elicitation, Laury et al. (2012)
estimate an annual discount rate of 55.5% assuming linear utility.
This falls to 14.1% after correcting for utility using a risk preference
task. In their main probabilistic discounting task Laury et al.
estimate a discount rate of 12.2%, with a confidence interval that
overlaps substantially with that obtained through joint elicitation
but not with that assuming linear utility.11
A drawback of this design is that it requires subjects to discern
very fine increments in pt+k, as small as 0.001. As it turns out, one-
third of subjects switch at the first non-zero interest rate, where
pt+k increases from 0.500 to 0.501. These subjects might be very
patient, but it could also be that the presentationmakes increasing
probability most salient, causing them to neglect the back-end
delay (which is constant).
Instead of interacting risk with time, Takeuchi (2011) elicits
separate choices under risk and over time using matched pairs of
payoffs. On one hand, he elicits pY such that a subject is indifferent
between X with a given probability pX (and zero otherwise), or
Y > X with probability pY . From this, and assuming expected
utility, u (X) /u (Y ) = pY/pX . On the other hand, and using
the same payoffs, he elicits k such that the same subject is
indifferent between X at a given date t , or Y at t + k. From this,
D (t + k) /D (t) = v (X) /v (Y ). Finally, invoking equivalence of
utility for risk and time u (·) ≡ v (·), one infers that:
D (t + k)
D (t)
= pY
pX
. (6)
Comparing this to (5) highlights the similarity in underlying
logic of the Laury et al. (2012) and Takeuchi (2011) designs, the
main difference being in the procedure used to elicit an equivalent
probability: a single choice list in Laury et al. versus two matching
tasks in Takeuchi.
Takeuchi (2011) conducts an experiment using 56 US student
subjects, with parameters pX = 1, t = 0, and ten combinations
of X and Y taking values between USD 5 and 25. Since D (0) = 1,
(6) reduces to D (k) = pY , where both k and pY are elicited from
the same subject in separate matching tasks. Each such pair thus
identifies a single point on that subject’s discount function.
11 By combining their probabilistic discounting and joint elicitation data, Laury
et al. estimate a specification that allows for probability weighting (as well as
delivering an estimate of the utility function). However, by itself, their probabilistic
discounting task can only elicit the discount ratewithout knowledge of utility under
the assumption of expected utility.Takeuchi fits a generalized Weibull discount function for each
subject. For 33 subjects for whom this works well, the average
discount function is hyperbolic. For these subjects, when linear
utility is imposed (by substituting X/Y instead of pY/pX in (6)),
the discount rates increase, consistent with concave utility.12
However, for the remaining subjects the fit of the model is
conspicuously poor, and is considerably improved when linear
utility is instead imposed. For those subjects, this may be
suggestive of violation of the assumption of equivalence of utility
for risk and time.
5. Inferring utility directly from choices over time
The approaches considered to this point involve choices over
alternatives in which a subject only receives payment on a single
date. A key insight of the next set of designs is that to identify the
curvature of instantaneous utility it is necessary to offer choices
over alternatives that pay at both t and t + k, and to vary the size
of the difference between xt+k and xt . In other words, to identify
intertemporal substitution, subjects should have the opportunity
to choose the extent to which they wish to smooth payments over
time.13
5.1. The convex time budget design
The convex time budget (CTB) design of Andreoni and Sprenger
(2012a) is the leading alternative to the joint elicitation approach.
Recall that the binary choice list design offers a series of choices
between X at date t (and nothing at t + k) or Y at t + k
(and nothing at t). Andreoni and Sprenger note that when utility
is linear – as was assumed in the original applications of the
binary choice design – restricting the choice set to these corners
does not constrain subjects’ optimal choices. However if utility
is concave then, given the opportunity, subjects would prefer a
convex combination to either extreme.
Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a) design an experiment in which
subjects may choose any allocation they wish from the linear
budget line connecting (X, 0) and (0, Y ):
Y
X · xt + xt+k = Y
where the implied interest rate over k periods is r = YX − 1.
If instantaneous utility v (·) is concave, discounted utility (3) is
maximized at an interior solution where:
D (t)
D (t + k) ·
v′ (xt)
v′ (xt+k)
= 1+ r. (7)
As the interest rate varies, a subject’s choices trace out a price
expansion path in (xt , xt+k) space. As (7)makes clear, these choices
depend on both the utility and discount functions. Therefore to
12 One unappealing feature of Takeuchi’s results is that the estimated annual
discount rate is extremely high at 726%. This is striking given that it controls for
non-linear utility, and uses a similar logic and subject pool to Laury et al. (2012).
Contributing factors may include: the use of matching tasks in which subjects’
responses are open-ended, the absence of any front-end delay, and the smaller
magnitude of payoffs compared to Laury et al.
13 As (4)makes clear, the impact of non-linear utility increaseswith the difference
between xt+k and xt , vanishing when xt+k = xt . If one of the payoffs is always zero,
as in the classic binary choice list design, this difference is effectively at amaximum.
Analogously in Holt and Laury for risk, the curvature of Bernoulli utility is identified
from the fact that the difference in payoffs between states (rolls of a ten-sided die)
is small in lottery A, whereas it is large in lottery B. See Cheung (2015b) for related
discussion.
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and payment dates orthogonally across CTB decisions.
Andreoni and Sprenger conduct an experiment using 97 US
student subjects, with t ∈ {0, 1, 5} weeks, k ∈ {5, 10, 14} weeks,
Y = USD 20 or 25,14 and annual interest rates up to 1300%. Given
these parameters, if the concavity of utility typically found in risk
preference experiments were to also characterize intertemporal
substitution, onewould expect to observe a very strong preference
for interior allocations, quite close to the midpoint of the budget
set, notwithstanding the high interest rates on offer.15
Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a) instead find that most choices
are corner solutions: overall, 17.1% are all-sooner and 52.4% all-
later. They estimate an annual discount rate of 30.0% and find
that utility is significantly concave, with a CRRA coefficient of
0.08. However, this is much closer to linearity than the estimates
typically obtained from risk preference data, as used in the joint
elicitation approach.
Harrison et al. (2013) critique Andreoni and Sprenger’s use of
a non-linear least squares estimator, which seeks to explain the
mean allocation, given that the mass of data is at the corners
and not close to the mean. Harrison et al. propose a multinomial
logit estimator, which seeks to explain the entire distribution of
choices. Applying this to the Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a) data
they estimate significantly convex utility, with a CRRA coefficient
of −0.36 for a representative agent—a result explained by the
need for the estimator to account for choices at both corners.
Nonetheless, this does not alter the observation that the incidence
of corner solutions is incompatible with the concavity of utility
found in risk preference experiments.
5.2. The convex time budget under risk
Andreoni and Sprenger (2012b) conduct a second experiment
in which they extend the CTB approach to settings in which
payments are subject to risk. Their main result is that when
payments on both dates are sentwith probability 0.5, the incidence
of corner solutions falls to 26.1% compared to 80.7% when both
payments are certain. One interpretation, hinted at by their title
‘‘Risk preferences are not time preferences’’, is that utility under
risk may be more concave than under certainty.
The difficulty with this explanation is that because the
experiment involves an interaction between risk and time, the
door is opened for a third preference, known as correlation
aversion (Richard, 1975; Epstein and Tanny, 1980), to explain the
result (see Andersen et al., 2011, Section 5, and Harrison et al.,
2013 on this point). Recall that risk aversion is characterized
under expected utility by concavity of Bernoulli utility, and
relates to the preference for more equal payoffs across states
of nature, while intertemporal substitution is characterized by
concavity of instantaneous utility, and relates to the preference to
smooth payoffs over time. Correlation aversion is characterized by
concavity of intertemporal utility, and gives rise to a preference to
spread risks more evenly over time.16
14 Whereas Andersen et al. (2008) vary interest rates by fixing X and increasing Y ,
Andreoni and Sprenger fix Y and decrease X .
15 See Harrison et al. (2013, Table 1) for a detailed analysis.
16 That is, the additive expression in (3) is replaced by a concave transformation.
Andersen et al. (2011) build upon joint elicitation to design an experiment to
identify correlation aversion, and find that their subjects are indeed correlation
averse. Ebert and van de Kuilen (2015) also document correlation aversion in choice
over time (as well as in other domains).In particular, since Andreoni and Sprenger (2012b) realize
payments at t and t + k using two independent lotteries, a subject
can diversify these risks by choosing an interior solution whereas
at a corner solution all payment hinges on a single lottery. Since
this diversification motive does not operate when all payments
are certain, it provides an alternative explanation for their result.17
Cheung (2015a, Appendix A.2) demonstrates how, even assuming
equivalence of Bernoulli and instantaneous utility, the result may
be explained by correlation aversion. Cheung (2015a) reports two
replication experiments in which diversification is not possible;
in one the result disappears completely, while in the other it is
substantially diminished. Finally, he estimates a model that allows
for non-linear intertemporal utility, and confirms the correlation
aversion hypothesis.
Epper and Fehr-Duda (2015) and Schmidt (2014) offer alterna-
tive explanations for Andreoni and Sprenger’s result. Epper and
Fehr-Duda invoke rank-dependent probability weighting, while
Schmidt considers saving and borrowing outside the lab. In each
case, the arguments turn on the use of independent lotteries to re-
alize payment risk, and do not require separation between utility
for risk and time. They thus reiterate that Andreoni and Sprenger
do not establish conclusively that ‘‘Risk preferences are not time
preferences’’.
Thus to summarize the discussion of the CTBmethod: while the
prevalence of corner solutions in Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a)
is incompatible with the concavity of utility elicited under risk,
the results of Andreoni and Sprenger (2012b) do not provide clear
evidence for the separation of risk preference from intertemporal
substitution, due to the possibility of intertemporal diversification
in their experiment design.
5.3. Comparing utility for risk and time
To avoid the confound encountered by Andreoni and Sprenger
(2012b), it is necessary to compare the curvature of Bernoulli
utility elicited under risk to instantaneous utility elicited over
time, without interacting the two domains. Two recent studies
have sought to do exactly this. Moreover, both studies do so using
binary choices that are no more complex than those used in risk
preference experiments such as Holt and Laury (2002), which
find concave utility under risk. This is notable because it avoids
the possibility that the finding of near-linear utility over time in
Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a) – driven by a prevalence of corner
solutions –might be an artifact of the greater complexity of the CTB
task compared to binary choices.
Abdellaoui et al. (2013) use sequences of binary choices to elicit
the (certain, immediate) payoff that makes a subject indifferent
to either a risky or temporal bundle of payoffs.18 Thus for risk,
they elicit the certainty equivalent Xc of a gamble that pays Xg with
probability p, or Xb < Xg otherwise:
u (Xc) = w (p) · u

Xg
+ [1− w (p)] · u (Xb) (8)
where w (p) is a rank-dependent probability weight. The payoffs
Xg , Xb

vary across decisions, but p is fixed so it is only necessary
to identify a single probability weight. For time, Abdellaoui et al.
elicit the present equivalent Xp of a temporal prospect that pays X0
today and Xk at date k:
v

Xp
 = v (X0)+ D (k) · v (Xk) (9)
17 This concern does not arise for Laury et al. (2012), who also interact risk with
time, because their binary choice design ensures that a subject only ever faces the
realization of a single risk.
18 This discussion restricts attention to their analysis of the gain domain.
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a single point on the discount function.
While (8) and (9) appear to share a common structure, there is
an important difference that should be noted. For risk, the certainty
equivalent pays equal amounts in both states, and corresponds to
where an indifference curve intersects the diagonal in state-payoff
space. By contrast for time, the present equivalent pays solely
on a single date, and corresponds to where an indifference curve
intersects the axis in time-dated payoff space. Thus the procedures
used to measure utility for risk and time are not completely
comparable.19
Abdellaoui et al. (2013) elicit Xc and Xp using an iterative
procedure to find the point of indifference. This is theoretically
not incentive compatible if a subject recognizes how her response
to one item influences the choices offered to her subsequently.
In their first experiment all choices were hypothetical, so this
objection is moot; in a second experiment each subject had one
chance in twenty that one choice would count for payment. In this
second experiment there were 52 French student subjects, with
parameters p = 0.25, k = 6 months, seven payoff combinations
each for risk and time, and payoffs ranging up to EUR 200.
Abdellaoui et al. (2013) estimate a CARA utility function which
is not directly comparable to the CRRA specification reported
elsewhere. They find that utility for risk is significantly concave,
whereas for time the null hypothesis of linear utility cannot be
rejected. The estimated utility curvature parameters for risk and
time differ significantly from one another.
To compare utility for risk and time without interacting the
domains, Cheung (2015b) transposes the logic of the Holt and
Laury (2002) risk preference task into time-dated payoffs. In Holt
and Laury, the safe lottery offers more equal payoffs across good
and bad states, whereas payoffs in the risky lottery are more
unequal. Risk aversion is identified as a preference for the safe
lottery even at high probabilities of the good state.
To extend this logic to choice over time, Cheung constructs
choice lists over vectors of payments on two dates. One option is
smaller sooner, in that it pays less in total but more on the sooner
date, while the other is larger later. Interest rates are varied by
adjusting the back-end delay, holding the payoffs fixed.20 In some
choice lists, the smaller sooner option is more evenly distributed
over payment dates than the larger later one, while in others
this relation is reversed. In this manner – by varying interest
rates orthogonally to implications for intertemporal substitution
– discounting and utility curvature are separately identified.
By construction of the payoffs, a subject with linear utility
is predicted to make the same choices in every list. However,
a subject with concave utility will favor a more evenly spread
payoff vector—both when it is smaller sooner and when it is
larger later. This subject thus chooses the smaller sooner option at
higher interest rates in choice lists where it is more evenly spread,
compared to where it is not.
Cheung (2015b) conducts an experiment using 122 Australian
student subjects, with t = 1 week, k declining from 27 to 0 weeks
(generating interest rates that increase from 25% to infinity),21 and
payoffs up to AUD 38. Subjects also completed a single Holt and
Laury risk choice list using matched payoffs.
19 Recall that the impact of diminishing marginal utility upon the slope of an
indifference curve is maximized at the axis, and vanishes at the diagonal, so this
distinction is not inconsequential.
20 This is analogous to varying the probability of the good state over the rows of
the choice list in Holt and Laury.
21 Continuing the analogy to Holt and Laury, the final decision in each list involved
a dominated alternative.As implied by concave utility, Cheung finds that subjects prefer
more evenly spread payoffs, choosing smaller sooner more when
it is the more evenly distributed option in the choice list. This
difference is highly significant, with p < 0.001 in a signed-ranks
test. Yet its size is modest: on average 0.5 rows per list of ten
choices; under risk, the same subjects make 2.1 more safe choices
than predicted by linear utility. The estimated instantaneous utility
function is significantly concave – in contrast to Abdellaoui et al.
(2013) – but less concave than Bernoulli utility elicited under risk,
with a CRRA coefficient of 0.02 for time compared to 0.55 for risk
(under expected utility). As a result, the estimated annual discount
rate falls from 63.9% assuming linear utility to 62.6% adjusting
for the curvature of instantaneous utility,22 and the confidence
intervals largely overlap. Thuswhile instantaneous utility is indeed
concave, the effect of correcting for it is much smaller than in
the joint elicitation approach where utility is inferred from choice
under risk.
6. Eliciting discounting without utility
The approaches reviewed in Section 5.3 infer utility directly
from choices over time, and compare utilities estimated separately
for risk and time. These methods do not presuppose any equiva-
lence between utility concepts, but involve the measurement of
both utility and discounting. Analogous to the probability-based
methods reviewed in Section 4.2, it may be attractive to consider
the possibility of bypassing utility to identify the discount function
directly—onlywithout presuming equivalence of utility for risk and
time.
A recent paper by Attema et al. (in press) attempts this by
moving beyond the framework of Eq. (3) – inwhich choices involve
at most two payment dates – to elicit preferences over quasi-
continuous streams of payments. The approach is analogous to the
probability-based design of Laury et al. (2012) in that it involves
a single nonzero payoff M , allowing its utility v (M) to cancel out
of any indifference relation. However instead of making choices
over the probability with which M is paid, subjects make choices
over the subset of dates on which they receive payment, from some
overall horizon T . Since no risk is involved, in contrast to Laury et al.
(2012), it is not necessary to assume equivalence of utility for risk
and time.
For example, if a subject is indifferent between receiving M on
every date from 1 to τ (and nothing on any other date) or the same
amountM on every date from τ + 1 to T , one can infer that:
τ
t=1
D (t) · v (M) =
T
t=τ+1
D (t) · v (M) (10)
where v (M) cancels out on both sides. In this manner it is possible
to construct inferences about integrals of the discount function
from which, given sufficient data, the underlying function may be
recovered.
To infer information about the discount function from any of
the designs reviewed in this survey, it is necessary to assume that
subjects will consume payment on the date that it is received.
However, this requirement is particularly strong when there are
multiple payment dates: for v (M) to drop out of (10), one must
assume that every payment will be consumed at the time that it is
received.
22 The estimation procedure to correct for non-linear utility is essentially identical
to the joint elicitation framework of Andersen et al. (2008, 2014), differing only in
the source of information used to identify the curvature of utility.
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Summary of time preference elicitation strategies.
Assume equivalence?
Yes No
Measure utility?
Section 4.1 Section 5
Yes Andersen et al. (2008)
Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a)
Abdellaoui et al. (2013)
Cheung (2015b)
Section 4.2 Section 6
No Laury et al. (2012) Attema et al. (in press)Takeuchi (2011)Attema et al. (in press) conduct an experiment using 104 Dutch
student subjects, with parametersM = EUR 20 and T = 52weeks.
One subject in each session received real payment for one of her
choices.
Attema et al. find that the standard exponential discount
function fits best among the alternatives they consider. They
estimate an annual discount rate of 35%, which does not differ
significantly from that estimated using a version of joint elicitation.
This is an intriguing result: since joint elicitation infers utility from
risky choices, while Attema et al.’s method makes no assumption
about utility, it indirectly suggests that utilitymaynot differ for risk
and time. This is in contrast to Abdellaoui et al. (2013) and Cheung
(2015b), who measure utility separately for risk and time and find
them to differ.
7. Discussion
Table 1 classifies the studies reviewed in this survey on two
dimensions: whether utility under risk is assumed to be the same
as utility over time, and whether the procedure yields a measure
of utility. Looking firstly at designs that involve a measurement of
utility (the top row of Table 1), joint elicitation (Section 4.1) infers
Bernoulli utility u (·) from a risk preference task, whereby utility is
found to be substantially concave. By contrast the studies reviewed
in Section 5 infer instantaneous utility v (·) directly from choices
over time, finding that it is only mildly concave and in fact quite
close to linear. From this, it would be tempting to conclude that
the former approach should be avoided, and the latter preferred.
However, before jumping to this conclusion, recall that joint
elicitation embeds within it the classic binary choice design that
assumes linear utility—it is only at the estimation stage that risk
and time data are combined and the risk-elicited utility function
superimposed. It is thus a strength of joint elicitation that it
allows for the discount function to be estimated both assuming
equivalence of utility for risk and time and under linear utility.
For this reason, the approach has some inherent robustness to the
possibility that instantaneous utilitymay be near-linear. Moreover
in many applied and field settings, subjects’ risk preferences are
of independent interest, so it is useful to collect data on both risk
and time preferences irrespective of whether they are combined
at the estimation stage. On the other hand, the probability-based
methods reviewed in Section 4.2 are indeed best avoided, given
that they necessarily presuppose equivalence of utility for risk and
time, andmoreover – by design – they do not yield anymeasure of
the implied utility function.
The research reviewed in this survey is very recent, so it is dif-
ficult to make definitive recommendations beyond what has been
argued above. However there is a clear need for further research
along the lines of the studies reviewed in Section 5.3, which com-
pare utilities elicited separately for risk and time. In particular, the
finding of near-linear utility over time should be verified and better
understood. Only by making explicit measurements – and not by-
passing utility altogether, however appealing this may be – will itbe possible to empirically adjudicate the validity of competing de-
signs. Despite this current state of uncertainty, the developments
reviewed in this survey have indeed brought significant advances
in understanding—and the field of time preference remains a rich
and exciting one for experimental research.
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